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People with schizophrenia who hallucinate show impairments in reality monitoring (the
ability to distinguish internally generated information from information obtained from
external sources) compared to non-hallucinating patients and healthy individuals. While
this may be explained at least in part by an increased externalizing bias, it remains un-
clear whether this impairment is specific to reality monitoring, or whether it also reflects
a general deficit in the monitoring of self-generated information (internal source moni-
toring). Much interest has focused recently on continuum models of psychosis which
argue that hallucination-proneness is distributed in clinical and non-clinical groups, but
few studies have directly investigated reality monitoring and internal source monitoring
abilities in healthy individuals with a proneness to hallucinations. Two experiments are
presented here: the first (N ¼ 47, with participants selected for hallucination-proneness
from a larger sample of 677 adults) found no evidence of an impairment or external-
izing bias on a reality monitoring task in hallucination-prone individuals; the second
(N ¼ 124) found no evidence of atypical performance on an internal source monitoring
task in hallucination-prone individuals. The significance of these findings is reviewed in
light of the clinical evidence and the implications for models of hallucination generation
discussed.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).hology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EB, UK.
ons).
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Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH), or the experience of
hearing a voice in the absence of any speaker, are experienced
by a large proportion of individuals with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia, as well as those with other psychiatric di-
agnoses such as bipolar disorder and post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), and by approximately 1% of the healthy
population (Kra˚kvik et al., 2015). Cognitive and neuroscientific
studies aimed at understanding the underlying mechanisms
of AVH have compared task performance and/or neural acti-
vation between individuals with psychiatric diagnoses who
hallucinate and those who do not (Stephane, Kuskowski,
McClannahan, Surerus, & Nelson, 2010), as well as between
groups of individuals with no clinical diagnoses who report
differing levels of hallucination-proneness (Larøi, Van der
Linden, & Marczewski, 2004). One of the most prominent
cognitive models of AVH holds that these symptoms occur
when internal mental events, such as inner speech, are mis-
attributed to an external, non-self-generated source (Bentall,
1990; Frith, 1992; Moseley, Fernyhough, & Ellison, 2013). As
such, research has focused on the question of how we typi-
cally distinguish between different sources of information,
and how these processes might fail.
The Source Monitoring Framework addresses how we
make judgements about the origin (source) of remembered
information, using characteristics such as perceptual, se-
mantic, or affective content, or the nature of the earlier
cognitive operations (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993).
Source monitoring can be broadly divided into three sub-
categories depending on the contrasts which must be made:
1. External source monitoring, where the distinction is be-
tween non-self-generated sources of information, such as
whether an image appeared on the left or right side of a
screen; 2. Internal source monitoring, where a distinction
must bemade between self-generated sources of information,
such as whether a sentence had previously been spoken aloud
or internally using inner speech; and 3. Reality monitoring,
involving discrimination between internal and external
sources of information, such as whether a sentence had been
spoken by the individual or by someone else, or even whether
an event had beenwitnessed or dreamt. Each of these variants
are commonly tested using a source memory paradigm,
requiring the participant to encode stimuli from different
sources, and on later re-presentation of the stimuli, to judge
the original source of the stimuli. For example, a reality
monitoring task might present participants with a series of
verbal word-pairs (e.g., bubble and squeak), which are shown
either completed (‘perceived’, that is externally generated,
e.g., bubble and squeak) or where the second word must be
supplied by the participant (‘imagined’, that is, internally
generated, e.g., bubble and s____). Reality monitoring ability
might then be assessed by asking the participant to remember
whether the second word of the word-pair had previously
been perceived or imagined.
Reality monitoring ability in healthy individuals is associ-
ated with activity in the medial anterior prefrontal cortex,
(PFC, e.g., Simons, Henson, Gilbert, & Fletcher, 2008; Simons,
Davis, Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2006; Turner, Simons,Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2008), as well as to structural
morphology of the nearby paracingulate sulcus (PCS; Buda,
Fornito, Bergstrom, & Simons, 2011). Patients with schizo-
phrenia show impairments in reality monitoring ability (e.g.,
Anselmetti et al., 2007; Brebion et al., 2000; Waters, Maybery,
Badcock, & Michie, 2004), which are associated with
dysfunction in the medial anterior PFC (Subramaniam et al.,
2012; Vinogradov, Luks, Schulman, & Simpson, 2008), as well
as to altered PCS morphology (Garrison, Fernyhough,
McCarthy-Jones, Haggard, & Simons, 2015). Indeed, Garrison
et al. (2015) indicated that a shorter PCS was associated with
a higher likelihood of hallucinations in patients with schizo-
phrenia, with these findings together suggesting that the PCS,
and surrounding anterior medial PFC, may be associated with
both reality monitoring and hallucinations. Considering the
wider underlying network for AVH, an fMRI study with
healthy individuals observed increased activation in the area
surrounding the auditory cortices in the superior temporal
gyrus (STG) during the encoding stage of a reality monitoring
task, which correlated with measures of hallucination-
proneness (Sugimori, Mitchell, Raye, Greene, & Johnson,
2014). Both the PCS and STG regions are often observed to be
active during the experience of AVH in ‘symptom-capture’
fMRI studies (e.g., Zmigrod, Garrison, Carr, & Simons, 2016).
To test the suggestion that reality monitoring deficits play
a causal role in the generation of AVH, research has focused
on the behavioural association between atypical source
monitoring and the presence or intensity of hallucinations.
Two mechanisms have been proposed which might explain
this deficit: an externalizing bias and a general source moni-
toring deficit. The idea of externalizing bias stems from the
observation made during reality monitoring studies involving
healthy individuals, that participants often exhibit a greater
likelihood of falsely attributing new or internally generated
items to an external source, than of making the reverse error
(Johnson, Raye, Foley, & Foley, 1981; see Garrison, Bond,
Gibbard, Johnson, & Simons, 2016, for a discussion). Bentall
(1990) argued that since hallucinations are internally gener-
ated events experienced as external, atypical source moni-
toring in individuals with AVH is most likely to manifest itself
as an enhanced externalizing bias (in which self-generated
information is more likely to be misattributed as externally-
generated). Behavioral evidence supports this proposal, with
a recent meta-analysis finding that patients with hallucina-
tions have a greater tendency tomisattribute internal items to
external sources than non-hallucinating individuals or
healthy controls (Brookwell, Bentall, & Varese, 2013).
An alternative possibility is that individuals with AVH
exhibit general source monitoring deficits, which can be
observed in terms of poorer performance across all types of
source memory tasks. Such a deficit might arise in addition to
an externalizing bias (e.g., the deficit might be explained by
some variation in the application of criteria used to determine
the internal/external nature of mental experience), or may
itself be related to the generation of the bias (e.g., if the weak
application of decision-making criteria generally has a greater
impact on the recognition of self-generated status than of
external status). Evidence suggests that as well as deficits in
reality monitoring, patients with schizophrenia do often
exhibit internal and external source memory deficits when
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Furthermore, the few studies which have compared source
monitoring deficits in patients with and without hallucina-
tions offer some support for an association between general
source monitoring deficits and hallucinations (Franck et al.,
2000; Gawe˛da, Woodward, Moritz, & Kokoszka, 2013).
Interpreting the results of such empirical comparisons
between patients and healthy individuals can be affected by
the confound of medication status, and by other factors.
Continuum models of psychosis, which suggest that that ex-
periences such as AVH are distributed throughout the general
population, infer that studying non-clinical individuals with a
proneness to hallucinate can provide a usefulmodel of clinical
syndromes (van Os & Reininghaus, 2016). Based on this
approach, a small number of studies have investigated
whether individuals with no psychiatric diagnosis who report
hallucinatory experiences exhibit the same bias and/or deficit
in source monitoring that has been associated with patients
with schizophrenia. This area remains under-researched e in
their review, Brookwell et al. (2013) reported three source
monitoring studies in non-clinical populations, only one of
which has been published. Larøi et al. (2004) tested under-
graduate students on a reality monitoring task, classifying
participants according to their score on a self-report ques-
tionnaire, the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS). They
found that high hallucination-prone individuals were more
likely to misattribute self-generated words as having been
spoken by the experimenter than those in the low
hallucination-prone group, whereas there was no difference
between the groups in other errors, or in recognition memory
for previously presented words. However, in contrast, one
study published since the Brookwell et al. meta-analysis
found no effect of non-clinical hallucination-proneness on
reality monitoring (Subject/Experimenter discrimination;
McKague, McAnally, Skovron, Bendall, & Jackson, 2012).
It thus remains unclear whether the reality monitoring
impairment observed in patients with schizophrenia who
hallucinate is also present in non-clinical hallucination-prone
samples. Furthermore, to our knowledge, no study has tested
the relationship between hallucination-proneness in a non-
clinical sample and performance on internal source moni-
toring tasks, which might support the presence of a general-
ised deficit in source monitoring in the generation of
hallucinations. Here, we report data from two separate ex-
periments conducted with individuals recruited from two
university populations, which investigated whether non-
clinical hallucination-proneness is associated with impair-
ments in sourcememory performance, and if so, whether this
is explained by an externalizing bias and/or a general internal
source monitoring deficit. Experiment 1 recruited participants
who scored in the top or bottom quartiles of a version of the
LSHS, and tested for an association between self-reported
hallucination-proneness and reality monitoring perfor-
mance. Experiment 2 tested for an association between
hallucination-proneness and internal source monitoring per-
formance (overt/covert speech judgements). The external-
izing bias model of AVH would predict that, on the reality
monitoring task, higher hallucination-proneness should be
associated with a greater tendency towards incorrectly
responding that words spoken by the participant were spokenby the experimenter, and that word-pairs which had been
imagined should be judged to have been perceived. If such
effects reflect an externalizing bias, they should be specific to
the reality monitoring task, with no difference observed on
the internal source monitoring task. Alternatively, a general
source monitoring deficit account of AVH would predict that
higher hallucination-proneness would be associated with
lower overall performance on both the reality monitoring task
and the internal source monitoring task.2. Experiment 1: reality monitoring
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
677 participants were recruited to an on-line questionnaire by
email invitation from volunteer lists maintained at the
Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute at Cambridge
University, and the Department of Psychology, Durham Uni-
versity, and from advertisements in the Cambridge and
Durham areas. There was no financial incentive to participate
and ethical approval for the study was obtained from the
University of Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Com-
mittee. An individual's proneness to auditory hallucinations
was assessed using a modified version (Morrison, Wells, &
Nothard, 2000) of the Predisposition to Auditory Hallucina-
tion subscale of the Revised Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale
(LSHS-R, Bentall & Slade, 1985; see Section 2.1.2). Individuals
who had LSHS-R scores in the upper or lower quartile (High-
LS, or Low-LS) indicating high or low proneness to auditory
hallucinations were invited for testing using the reality
monitoring task in the Department of Psychology at either the
University of Cambridge or Durham University.
Twenty-five individuals were tested in the High-LS group
(number of females ¼ 18; mean age ¼ 19.8, SD ¼ 2.8 years;
mean LSHS-R score ¼ 13.2, SD ¼ 2.1), and 22 individuals in the
Low-LS group (number of females ¼ 20; mean age ¼ 22.9,
SD ¼ 7.5 years; mean LSHS-R score ¼ 2.1, SD ¼ 1.4). Proneness
to auditory hallucinations, as measured by the LSHS-R,
differed significantly between these groups: t(45) ¼ 20.973,
p < .001. There were no significant differences between the
groups in terms of age [t(45) ¼ 1.932, n.s.] or sex (c2 ¼ 2.703,
n.s.), all participants reported being native English speakers,
and no participants reported any hearing problems.
2.1.2. Design and procedure
Self-report measures e The revised version of the Launay-
Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R), used to assess predispo-
sition to hallucinatory experiences in the auditory modality,
comprises five questions (e.g., I have had the experience of
hearing a person's voice and then found that no-one was there), with
each item scored on a five-point Likert scale ranging from
‘never’ (0) to ‘almost always’ (4). Total scores can thus range
from 0 to 20 with higher scores indicating a greater predis-
position to auditory hallucinations. The original scale was
modified byMcCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough (2011) to remove
a question with a low endorsement rate and improve internal
reliability, and in testing was found to have satisfactory psy-
chometric properties.
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used previously (Simons et al., 2006; Simons et al., 2008) and
involved the initial presentation of word-pairs followed by a
test phase. In the test phase, the participant was asked to
indicate whether a word had earlier been presented within an
intact word-pair using the response ‘Perceived’, or had been
presented in a word-pair which had needed to be completed
by imagining the missing word, with the response ‘Imagined’.
Participants were also required to judge whether the word-
pair had previously been spoken aloud by themselves (‘Sub-
ject’ response) or was spoken by the researcher (‘Experi-
menter’ response). Previously unstudiedwords were also used
in the test phase, requiring a ‘New’ response. The stimuli
consisted of 216 well-known word-pairs (e.g., ‘Laurel and
Hardy’, ‘Bacon and Eggs’), which were pilot tested for the cur-
rent study to ensure their familiarity among adults in the
target demographic range. The task comprised 6 separate
study and test blocks, with 24 word-pair stimuli in each study
phase (six word-pairs presented in four combinations of
Subject/Experimenter Perceived/Imagined conditions; Fig. 1)
and an additional 12 new words included in the test phase.Fig. 1 e Stimuli used in the Reality Monitoring Tasks. Note:
Sample stimuli used in the study phase (left) and test phase
(right) of the reality monitoring task. In a 2 £ 2 design,
either the subject or experimenter spoke aloud the stimuli,
which were presented either complete (perceived) or
incomplete (requiring the second word to be imagined).
Subjects were then presented at test with the first word of a
word pair, and asked to judge whether the accompanying
word had been seen or imagined, or if the presented word
was new; or whether the subject or experimenter had read
aloud the word pair, or the presented word was new.Each study trial commenced with a screen indicating
whether the subject or experimenter should read aloud the
word-pair. The word-pair was then shown, either complete
(perceived trials) or with only the first letter of the second
word provided such that the second word needed to be self-
generated (imagined trials). In both cases the subject or
experimenter then had 3 s to read aloud the entire word-
pair, completing the word-pair as necessary for imagined
trials. Each study phase was followed by its corresponding
test phase, consisting of one sub-block for each of the two
reality monitoring conditions. The sub-blocks commenced
with a question screen indicating which condition was being
tested, i.e., for the Perceived/Imagined condition: ‘Was the
accompanying word Seen or Imagined or New?’, and for the
Subject/Experimenter condition: ‘Was the accompanying word
said by Self or Researcher or New?’ These were then followed
by a test screen containing the first word from one of the
studied word-pairs, or a new word, together with the in-
struction to provide the appropriate response. Participants
had 4 sec to make their response.
The order of presentation of sub-blocks in the test phase
alternated across the six full blocks of the task and was
counterbalanced across participants. Theword-pairs assigned
to the Perceived/Imagined and Subject/Experimenter condi-
tions, as well as newwords, were also counterbalanced across
participants, and the order of presentation of word-pairs was
pseudo-randomized to ensure no run of more than three
items of the same condition in any study or test phase.
2.1.3. Data analysis
Old/New recognition accuracy was calculated as the adjusted
item recognition score (hits minus false alarms, with hits
being defined as the proportion of words correctly recognised
as previously seen and false alarms the proportion of new
words incorrectly endorsed as old). Reality monitoring accu-
racy was calculated as the number of accurate source re-
sponses divided by the number of correct responses
recognising an item as old.
Misattribution errors were calculated for perceived and
imagined trials as the number of responses made for the
alternative reality monitoring response as a proportion of
total errors made. So for example, ‘Imagined judged
Perceived’ errors were calculated as the number of perceived
responses that were made to imagined trials divided by the
sum of perceived and new responses to imagined trials. This
gives a measure of misattribution error unrelated to overall
item recognition accuracy for each condition. The proportion
of internalisation errors (Perceived judged Imagined, or
Experimenter judged Subject) was then compared to the pro-
portion of externalisation errors (Imagined judged Perceived
or Subject judged Experimenter) for each participant, to give a
measure of externalizing bias. Eight participants made no
errors for one or more of the study conditions for the
Perceived/Imagined task (6 in the High-LS and 2 in the Low-LS
conditions) and 15 (8 in the High-LS and 7 in the Low-LS
conditions) for the Subject/Experimenter task; these partici-
pants were excluded from the misattribution bias analysis
only.
Preliminary analyses confirmed the absence of significant
effects of potentially confounding variables of participants'
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racy or externalizing bias, all F's(1,44) < 3.291, n.s.2.2. Results
There was no difference between the high and low halluci-
nation proneness groups for Old/New memory, t(45) ¼ .416,
p ¼ .679, d ¼ .115, indicating that the groups had similar
recognition memory ability (Table 1).
To analyse the reality monitoring data, a mixed ANOVA
with High-LS and Low-LS group as between-subjects factor,
and the realitymonitoring condition (Subject/Experimenter or
Perceived/Imagined) as a within-subject factor, was conduct-
ed. There was a within subjects effect of task condition:
F(1,45)¼ 64.479, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .589, indicating that both groups
were better at judging whether a word-pair had been spoken
by the subject or experimenter, compared to distinguishing
whether a word-pair had been perceived or imagined. How-
ever, there was no main effect of hallucination-proneness
group, F(1,45) ¼ .014, p ¼ .905, hp2 ¼ .000, and no interaction
between hallucination-proneness group and reality moni-
toring condition: F(1,45) ¼ .460, p ¼ .501, hp2 ¼ .010, thus giving
no indication of an association between hallucination prone-
ness and reality monitoring ability.
To allow a direct comparison with the findings of the
similar study by Larøi et al. (2004), the results of the Subject/
Experimenter reality monitoring task were then broken down
for trials which had been spoken by the subject or by the
experimenter (Table 1). Contrary to the findings of the earlier
study, a mixed ANOVA with Subject/Experimenter accuracy
as DV, group as factor and whether the word-pair had been
spoken by the subject or experimenter (‘speaker’) as within-
subjects variable, revealed that while both groups were bet-
ter at the Subject/Experimenter discrimination for word-pairs
spoken by the Experimenter, F(1, 45) ¼ 31.744, p < .001,
hp
2 ¼ .414, there was no group difference in subjects' ability to
remember that they had previously spoken the word-pair,
compared with their memory for experimenter spoken stim-
uli, i.e., no significant group  speaker interaction: F(1,
45) ¼ .649, p ¼ .425, hp2 ¼ .014.Table 1 e Old/new recognition and reality monitoring
accuracy.
Accuracy variable Low-LS High-LS t statistic
(df ¼ 45)
p
M (SD) M (SD)
Old/New recognition .85 (.11) .86 (.05) ¡.416 .68
Perceived/Imagined
reality monitoring
.85 (.07) .84 (.08) .385 .70
Subject/Experimenter
reality monitoring
.92 (.05) .93 (.05) ¡.319 .75
Subject/Experimenter:
Subject generated
.88 (.08) .90 (.08) .583 .56
Subject/Experimenter:
Experimenter generated
.96 (.04) .96 (.03) .509 .62
Note: To aid comparison with the findings of Larøi et al. (2004) the
results of the Subject/Experimenter reality monitoring task were
further broken down for trials which had been spoken by the
subject or experimenter (results shown in un-bolded text).Finally, an analysis of errorswas undertaken by calculating
amisattribution error rate as ameasure independent of reality
monitoring accuracy, to give an indication of the proportion of
errors that were ascribed to the alternate reality monitoring
condition as opposed to a new item (Fig. 2). A mixed ANOVA
was undertaken for the analysis of errors on the Perceived/
Imagined task, with themisattribution error rate as DV, group
as factor, and two within-subject variables of whether the
trials has been spoken by subject or experimenter, and
whether the error direction was internalising (that is,
Perceived judged Imagined) or externalising (that is, Imagined
judged Perceived). The analysis revealed no significant group
difference for the proportion of misattribution errors made
overall, F(1, 37)¼ .051, p¼ .823, hp2 ¼ .001, but with a consistent
externalizing bias for both groups, as measured by a greater
number of externalisation compared to internalisation errors
for each condition: F(1, 37) ¼ 59.146, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .615. This
externalising bias was not significantly different for items
which had been spoken by the subject or the experimenter:
F(1,37) ¼ 1.276, p ¼ .266, hp2 ¼ .033.
The analysis of variance of misattribution errors in the
Perceived/Imagined tasks did reveal a marginal interaction
between group and internaleexternal error direction, F(1,
37) ¼ 3.838, p ¼ .058, hp2 ¼ .094, suggesting that participants in
the High-LS group might have some tendency to make more
externalizing errors than participants in the Low-LS group.
However, when this possibility was tested, there was found to
be no overall difference between the groups in either the
proportion of externalising errors, [I judged P: t(45) ¼ .995,
p ¼ .326, d ¼ .291], or internalising errors, [P judged I:
t(45) ¼ .439, p ¼ .663, d ¼ .127]. Furthermore, the absence of a
three way, group  error direction  (spoken by subject or
experimenter) condition interaction, F(1, 37) ¼ .654, p ¼ .424,
hp
2 ¼ .017, suggests that any such tendency was not associated
with information that had been specifically generated by the
subject, as opposed to by the experimenter.
A similar analysis of variance undertaken for the Subject/
Experimenter task also revealed an externalizing bias for both
groups: F(1, 30) ¼ 42.594, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .587, suggesting that
participants weremore likely to ascribe a word-pair spoken by
themselves to the experimenter than they were a word-pair
spoken by the experimenter to themselves. This was the
case regardless of whether the stimulus had earlier been
perceived or imagined at encoding: F(1, 30) ¼ .274, p ¼ .605,
hp
2 ¼ .009. There was no difference between the groups for the
proportion of misattribution errors made, nor any other sig-
nificant main effects or interactions, F(1,30) < 2.231, p > .146,
hp
2 < .069.
The analysis of misattribution errors across both reality
monitoring conditions therefore gives no evidence of an
enhanced externalising bias in individuals with a greater
proneness to AVH.3. Experiment 2: internal source monitoring
The second experiment used an internal source monitoring
paradigm, requiring participants to either read a word-pair to
themselves using inner speech (i.e., covert speech), or to read
a word-pair aloud (overt speech). At a later point, participants
Fig. 2 e Misattribution errors. Note: The two charts refer to items misclassified for each of the reality monitoring tasks,
broken down by the trial conditions. So for example, the first 2 bars in the left chart refer to items which had been imagined
by the subject, which were then incorrectly judged as perceived (an externalisation error), and the last 2 bars in the right
chart to items which had been imagined by the experimenter during encoding, but which the subject had later judged to
have been self-imagined (an internalisation error).
c o r t e x 9 1 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 9 7e2 0 7202were presented with each of the word-pairs again, and were
required to recall whether each had been read silently or
aloud. Given that this task required participants to make a
decision between only two options (covert or overt speech)
about each word-pair, the data was analyzed using signal
detection theory to investigate both sensitivity and bias on the
task. It was hypothesized that, if hallucination-proneness is
associated with a general source monitoring deficit, there
should be a significant positive correlation between LSHS-R
score and internal source monitoring task performance (task
sensitivity).
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
The sample consisted of 125 participants from the staff and
student population of DurhamUniversity, UK. One participant
was excluded from further analysis because their task sensi-
tivity (d') on the source monitoring task was <0, indicating
below chance performance, leaving a final sample size of 124
(number of females ¼ 96, mean age ¼ 20.7 years, SD ¼ 2.5
years). Participants all reported being native English speakers,
and no participants reported any hearing problems. Mean
score on the LSHS-R was 8.75 (SD ¼ 2.11). When participants
were categorized into high and low hallucination-proneness
groups, there was no difference in age or sex between
groups [age: t(42) ¼ 1.32, p ¼ .195; sex: c2 ¼ 1.91, p ¼ .167]. The
high hallucination-prone group scored significantly higher on
the LSHS-R (M ¼ 11.85, SD ¼ .93) than the low hallucination-
prone group (M ¼ 5.61, SD ¼ .61); t(42) ¼ 25.06, p < .001.
3.1.2. Design and procedure
The auditory items from the revised version of the LSHS-R
were again used to assess hallucination-proneness (see Sec-
tion 2.1.2), although in this experiment response options
ranged from 1 to 4 for each question, with total scores thus
able to range from 4 to 20, compared with 0e20 in Experiment
1. This difference arose due to an error in the reporting of
previous literature; McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough (2011)
described their revised version of the LSHS as comprisingquestions with response options 0e4, which was the basis for
the questionnaire used in Experiment 1. However, in a later
corrigendum, McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough clarified that a
1e4 scale had actually been used, and this corrected version
was adopted for our Experiment 2. Therefore, although the
questionnaires used in our two experiments consisted of
exactly the same questions, the mean scores are not directly
comparable.
Internal source monitoring task e In contrast to the task
used in Experiment 1, this source memory task, based loosely
on that used by Franck et al. (2000), asked participants to
distinguish between two internally generated sources:
whether verbal stimuli were spoken aloud using overt speech,
or said silently to themselves using covert (inner) speech. As
with the reality monitoring task, there were two stages to the
task, involving word-pair completion and subsequent recall.
Participants were not informed that they would be asked to
remember the word-pairs until immediately before the sec-
ond stage of the task.
In the word-pair completion stage, participants were pre-
sented with a series of 72 word-pairs (for example, ‘gold and
silver’), 36 of which they were instructed to say out loud (‘overt
speech’ trials), and 36 of which they were instructed to say to
themselves using inner speech (‘covert speech’ trials). To
manipulate the extent to which the stimuli were self-
generated, and in a similar way to the reality monitoring
task in Experiment 1, within each condition, 18 word-pairs
were fully presented to participants on-screen (e.g., ‘gold and
silver’, viz. ‘perceived’ trials), while the remaining 18were only
partially completed (e.g., ‘gold and s_____’, viz. ‘imagined’ tri-
als). For each trial, the participant was asked to say the full
word-pair (overtly or covertly); thus, half of the trials required
participants to produce the words themselves (imagined),
whereas half required the participant to read the word-pair
from the screen (perceived). The word-pairs were informally
tested in a small pilot study, to ensure that they were familiar
to the large majority of participants. Word-pairs were coun-
terbalanced across presentation mode (perceived or imag-
ined) and condition (overt/covert). For each trial, the
instruction (‘Out Loud’ or ‘Inner Speech’) appeared on the
Table 2 e Correlations between internal sourcemonitoring
task performance and auditory hallucination-proneness.
SMT measure Spearman's rho
d' (overall) .114
b (overall) .001
d' (imagined .076
b (imagined) .010
d' (perceived) .124
b (perceived) .001
Note: d' ¼ task sensitivity; b ¼ task response bias. Higher d' mea-
sures correspond to greater ability to distinguish between overtly
and covertly spoken words. Higher b values correspond to a more
conservative criterion for deciding a word was spoken overtly.
None of the correlations were significant at p < .05, even before
correction for multiple comparisons.
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followed by an inter-trial interval of 750 msec. If the partici-
pant did not know the correct word to complete a pair, they
were instructed to indicate this with a button press.
After the first stage was completed, participants took a
15 min break, during which they completed the LSHS-R, as
well as various other self-report questionnaires relating to
inner speech phenomenology (Varieties of Inner Speech
Questionnaire; McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough, 2011), and
anxiety and depression (Hospital Anxiety and Depression
Scale; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). These measures were not
intended to be linked to the source memory task, but were
included in association with other task-based measures that
were completed later in the testing session (to be reported
elsewhere; Moseley et al., in preparation). After 15 min, par-
ticipants were then asked to complete the memory test stage
of the task, in which theywere presentedwith the second part
of eachword-pair (e.g., ‘silver’), in a randomorder. Participants
were asked to try to judge whether they had previously said
each word out loud or using inner speech, responding with a
button press. This test phase was self-timed with each word
presented in the centre of the computer screen until a
response was made.
3.1.3. Data analysis
Signal detectionmeasures were used to analyze data from the
internal source monitoring task, as recommended by
McKague et al. (2012). ‘Hits’ were classified as overtly spoken
words correctly recalled as such, whilst false alarms were
classified as covertly spoken words incorrectly recalled as
overtly spoken (‘Miss’ and ‘correct rejection’ responses are not
reported here, since they are, necessarily, directly propor-
tional to hit and false alarm rates). d', a measure of task
sensitivity, was calculated as the standardised hit rate (z-score
of hit rate) minus the standardised false alarm rate (z-score of
false alarm rate), with a lower value indicating less ability to
distinguish the source of words. The second dependent vari-
able was b, a measure of response bias, which was calculated
as outlined by Stanislaw and Todorov (1999) (with a lower
value indicating a lower criterion for deciding that a word was
spoken aloud).
In contrast to Experiment 1, where an initial group split on
hallucination-proneness was used to invite participants for
behavioural testing, all participants in Experiment 2
completed both the LSHS-R self-report questionnaire and the
internal source monitoring task. Therefore, we first computed
correlations (Spearman's rho) between proneness to auditory
hallucinations and internal source monitoring performance
(sensitivity and response bias, for the imagined and perceived
conditions). To enable comparisonwith Experiment 1, we also
split participants into high hallucination-proneness (those
scoring in the upper quartile on the LSHS-R; N ¼ 26) and low
hallucination-proneness (scoring in the lower quartile on the
LSHS-R; N ¼ 18) groups, and compared performance on the
source monitoring task between these groups. There was a
significant difference between the high and low groups in
hallucination-proneness: t(42) ¼ 25.06, p < .001, as expected. A
2  2 mixed model ANOVA with a between-subjects variable
of hallucination-proneness group (high/low) and a within-
subjects variable of task condition (imagined/perceivedword-pairs) was therefore conducted with both d' and b as
dependent variables.3.2. Results
There were no significant correlations between proneness to
auditory hallucinations and internal source monitoring
performance for either of the conditions (perceived or
imagined) of the internal source monitoring task, or for task
performance overall, Spearman's rho  .124, all ps > .167 (see
Table 2).
A 2 2mixedmodel ANOVAwith task sensitivity (d') as the
dependent variable (Table 3) showed a main effect of imag-
ined/perceived status: F(1, 42) ¼ 44.27, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .513;
sensitivity was greater for imagined word-pairs (M ¼ 1.68,
SD ¼ .74) compared with those that had been perceived
(M ¼ 1.04, SD ¼ .61). There was a marginal main effect of
hallucination-proneness: F(1, 42) ¼ 3.36, p ¼ .074, hp2 ¼ .074.
There was no significant interaction between task condition
(Perceived/Imagined) and hallucination-proneness (high/low):
F(1, 42) ¼ .03, p ¼ .862, hp2 ¼ .001.
There was no difference in b between the task conditions,
F(1, 42) ¼ 1.10, p ¼ .299, hp2 ¼ .026, or hallucination-proneness
groups, F(1, 42) ¼ .017, p ¼ .896, hp2 < .001, and no significant
interaction between task condition (Perceived/Imagined) and
hallucination-proneness (high/low): F(1, 42) ¼ .073, p ¼ .788,
hp
2 ¼ .002. Thus, the experiment indicated no significant dif-
ferences between hallucination-proneness groups on any
measure of internal source monitoring.4. General discussion
The two experiments presented above addressed a key pre-
diction of continuum models of psychosis: whether source
monitoring impairments are associated with hallucination-
proneness in the non-clinical population, as they are in peo-
ple with clinical diagnoses who hallucinate. Experiment 1
found no difference in accuracy either for Old/New recogni-
tion, or for Perceived/Imagined or Subject/Experimenter re-
ality monitoring judgments, with effect sizes so low (hp
2  .02)
as to preclude a sample size explanation. While there was
Table 3 e Group performance on the internal source
monitoring task.
Source monitoring measure Hallucination-proneness
Low High
d' (imagined) 1.88 (.69) 1.61 (.66)
d' (perceived) 1.16 (.67) .85 (.53)
b (imagined) 1.58 (1.14) 1.62 (1.36)
b (perceived) 1.93 (1.32) 1.83 (1.08)
Note: d' ¼ task sensitivity; b ¼ task response bias. Measures shown
are mean scores, with SD in parentheses.
c o r t e x 9 1 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 9 7e2 0 7204clear evidence of a general externalizing bias in both reality
monitoring conditions, consistent with that previously re-
ported from studies in the healthy population (Johnson et al.,
1981), this was not found to be significantly enhanced in
participants in the high hallucination-proneness group.
A marginal interaction (p ¼ .058) between group and
internaleexternal error direction in the Perceived/Imagined
reality monitoring task suggested that there might be a ten-
dency for high hallucination-prone individuals to judge a
greater proportion of imagined word-pairs as perceived than
perceived words as imagined. However, this possibility was
not supported by analysis of the simple effects, and if such a
tendency is related to auditory hallucinations, then itmight be
expected to be specific to items that were generated by the
subject, which was not found to be the case. Furthermore,
there was no evidence of an enhanced externalizing bias in
the Subject/Experimenter reality monitoring task for the high
hallucination-prone group compared to the low
hallucination-prone group.
The results from Experiment 1 were supported by the
findings of Experiment 2, which investigated participants'
ability to discriminate between whether they had overtly or
covertly spoken a word-pair, which had been either perceived
or imagined during the encoding phase. No significant corre-
lations were found between task sensitivity or response bias
and hallucination-proneness, regardless of whether the
stimuli had previously been perceived or imagined. Further-
more, no differences were detected in task sensitivity and
response bias between groups of participants split by
hallucination-proneness as in Experiment 1. There was a
marginal reduction in overall task sensitivity for the higher
hallucination-proneness group (p ¼ .074), but this was not
supported by a significant correlation between task sensitivity
and hallucination-proneness score across the entire sample.
Indeed, the correlation effect sizes were so small (rho  .124)
that statistical power is again unlikely to be an explanation,
and there was no interaction for task sensitivity between
LSHS-R group and the perceived or imagined status of the
stimuli, as might be expected if the deficit related to the
inability to distinguish the source of imagined information
from that which had been perceived.
The results of these two experiments thus offer little or no
support for a deficit in source monitoring ability, and/or of
enhanced externalizing biases in hallucination-prone in-
dividuals in the healthy population. These findings contrast
with the findings of behavioral and neuroimaging studies in
patients with schizophrenia, which report associations be-
tween reality monitoring impairment and the presence ofAVH. Indeed we have demonstrated reality monitoring
impairment and dysfunction in the medial anterior PFC in
patientswith schizophrenia using a very similar version of the
task to that used in Experiment 1 (Garrison et al., in revision).
As such, the results are inconsistent with continuum models
of psychosis (van Os & Reininghaus, 2016), which assert that
hallucinations are distributed throughout the general popu-
lation, and thus which predict comparable effects in healthy
individuals who are prone to hallucinations as in patients
with schizophrenia who hallucinate. However, there are a
number of alternative possible explanations for the apparent
discrepancy in findings relating to the association between
source monitoring impairment and AVH in clinical and non-
clinical groups.
Firstly, it is possible that the assessment of hallucination-
proneness used in the present experiments was ineffective
in measuring individuals' proneness to AVH in the non-
clinical population. However, while the LSHS-R comprises
only five questions which ask about unusual auditory expe-
riences, the scale in its revised form has been well tested and
found to have satisfactory psychometric properties (see
McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough, 2011).
Alternatively, there may be only some shared overlap of
the mechanisms involved in clinical and non-clinical hallu-
cinatory experiences (as suggested by Badcock & Hugdahl,
2012), which might be especially true for the hallucinatory
experiences reported by the samples employed here. Larøi
(2012) proposed a (fuzzy) distinction between participants in
studies of non-clinical hallucinations research, referring to
these as Type i non-patients and Type ii non-patients. Par-
ticipants recruited in the current two experiments would be
classed as Type i non-patients, who typically report infre-
quent hallucinatory experiences that may be phenomeno-
logically distinct from the AVH reported by patients (e.g., brief
experiences that rarely take the form of complex utterances).
In contrast, Type ii non-patients often report relatively
frequent hallucinations that are phenomenologically more
similar to the AVH reported by patients, except in terms of
emotional valence and perceived controllability (Johns et al.,
2014). Thus, a reality monitoring impairment may not be
involved in the hallucinatory experiences reported by Type i
non-patients, but may be involved in the ‘full blown’ AVH
reported by Type ii non-patients as well as by patients.
A further question relates to how reality monitoring
impairment might be implicated in the generation of hallu-
cinations. Realitymonitoring is defined as amnemonic ability,
but the cognitive operations involved in monitoring the origin
of retrieved information might overlap with those that
monitor the origin of real time information (Johnson & Raye,
1981; discussed in; Garrison et al., 2016), with impairments
in these operations leading to the generation of hallucina-
tions. However, other mechanisms have been proposed to
explain the failure to correctly identify the origin of self-
generated information, which might manifest differently
across different groups of individuals. For example, AVH may
arise from enhanced perceptual content of self-generated
auditory information due to over-activation of secondary as-
sociation speech and language cortices, such as the voice-
selective auditory regions in the STG (Allen, Larøi, McGuire,
& Aleman, 2008). If activation of these brain areas results in
c o r t e x 9 1 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 9 7e2 0 7 205unusually vivid internal auditory imagery, such information
could be erroneously recognised as external in origin, without
any deficit in normal source monitoring activity. Consistent
with this suggestion, speech and language areas are active in
addition to anterior regions such as cingulate cortices during
hallucinations (Zmigrod et al., 2016), and a neuroimaging
study in healthy individuals indicated the presence of inter-
mittent episodes of significantly increased activity in bilateral
primary and secondary auditory cortices, together with
associated activations in the anterior cingulate cortex, even
during periods of silence (Hunter et al., 2006).
Alternatively, there may be a distinct impairment in the
self-monitoring processes which predict the sensory conse-
quences of actions through comparator forward modelling/
efference copymechanisms (Feinberg, 1978). Self-monitoring
accounts of reality testing suggest that AVH arise from a
disruption in the capacity to monitor the intention to pro-
duce inner speech (or other cognitions), resulting in it being
erroneously marked as external (Seal, Aleman, & McGuire,
2004). Such accounts thus provide an explanation for the
external directionality of errors without the need for any
deficit in a separate source monitoring process, as informa-
tion is assumed to be externally perceived in the absence of
an efference copy signal. However, while there is strong ev-
idence for self-recognition deficits in patients with schizo-
phrenia relating to motor action (Blakemore, Wolpert, &
Frith, 2002; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000), and some
support for corollary discharge dysfunction in schizophrenia
(Ford&Mathalon, 2004; Ford et al., 2001), direct evidence for a
specific comparator model relating to inner/covert speech or
auditory imagery is lacking. Furthermore, theoretical argu-
ments have been raised against the idea that the generation
of thought has the same physiological consequences as that
of motor action, with Gallagher (2004) arguing that the
self-monitoring account of hallucinations fails in applying
an explanation of motor function to one of cognitive
experience.
Finally, it should be noted that the findings of the reality
monitoring study in Experiment 1 are in contrast to those of
Larøi et al. (2004), who reported significant differences be-
tween low and high hallucination-prone healthy individuals
in the accuracy of self-generated, but not experimenter-
generated, stimuli. The discrepancy appears not to be
explained by the use of non-parametric statistics to analyze
the results in the Larøi et al. study, as similar non-parametric
analysis of our experiments did not alter our findings. What is
clear, however, is that the investigation of reality monitoring
and source monitoring deficits in clinical studies has also
produced a range of varying results (see Brookwell et al., 2013).
These might be explained by a wide variation in task design,
with some tasks using verbal stimuli and others using per-
formed or perceived actions, and with some tasks using only
the Subject/Experimenter or the Perceived/Imagined dis-
criminations separately. This may be the explanation for the
discrepancy in findings with the Larøi et al. study, which used
a Subject/Experimenter paradigm but with stimuli varying in
emotional valence and cognitive effort. Furthermore, Larøi
et al. used a version of the LSHS consisting of 16 questions,
many of which seem only indirectly related to hallucination-
proneness (e.g., “I have had a sensation of floating or falling, orthat I left my body temporarily”). In contrast, the present study
focused solely on auditory hallucinations. Using the same task
across clinical and non-clinical groups, together with tighter
control of confounding variables such as participants' age,
language skills or the presence of general memory deficits,
should help address variation across studies going forward.
We remain a long way from understanding the brain
mechanisms underpinning hallucinations, with many exist-
ing theoretical models of AVH failing to address the
complexity and diversity of hallucinations (for example, their
differing developmental trajectories, or complex interactions
with the individual). Understanding whether a single theo-
retical model can be applied to clinical and non-clinical hal-
lucinations will depend on the flexibility of the framework to
account for how factors implicated in the generation of these
perceptual anomalies might interact to explain differences in
phenomenological experience between groups, as well as the
variety in experience for a single individual. If such a
framework can be developed, this would map most closely to
quasi-dimensional models of schizotypy (Yung et al., 2005),
which allow for discontinuities in the experience of psychosis
across the population consistent with separable phenotypic
expressions of associated factors (Meehl, 1989; 1962), rather
than a fully-dimensional model (Claridge, 1972, 1994) more
supportive of an unbroken continuum. Although the work in
the present study does not support the role of reality-
monitoring ability as a factor in non-clinical hallucination-
proneness, this does not rule out more complex models
invoking reality monitoring as an important factor in the
transition between hallucination-proneness and more
frequent hallucinatory experiences, in clinical or non-clinical
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